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Few models of self-control have generated as much scientific interest as has the limited
strength model. One of the entailments of this model, the depletion effect, is the
expectation that acts of self-control will be less effective when they follow prior acts of
self-control. Results from a previous meta-analysis concluded that the depletion effect
is robust and medium in magnitude (d = 0.62). However, when we applied methods for
estimating and correcting for small-study effects (such as publication bias) to the data from
this previous meta-analysis effort, we found very strong signals of publication bias, along
with an indication that the depletion effect is actually no different from zero. We conclude
that until greater certainty about the size of the depletion effect can be established,
circumspection about the existence of this phenomenon is warranted, and that rather
than elaborating on the model, research efforts should focus on establishing whether the
basic effect exists. We argue that the evidence for the depletion effect is a useful case
study for illustrating the dangers of small-study effects as well as some of the possible
tools for mitigating their influence in psychological science.
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INTRODUCTION
For more than a decade, the proposition that self-control
relies on a limited resource has been a mainstay of theoriz-
ing on self-control that has influenced researchers across psy-
chology sub-disciplines, including social-personality (Inzlicht
et al., 2006), clinical (Christiansen et al., 2012), health (Hagger,
2010), cognitive (Pohl et al., 2013), and consumer psychology
(Baumeister et al., 2008). The limited strength model of self-
control specifies that volitional acts (e.g., controlling impulses,
overriding habitual responses, making choices) rely on a limited
resource. Consequently, because stores of the requisite resource
are depleted with use, attempts at self-control that follow previous
acts of self-control will be less successful (a phenomenon called
ego depletion; Baumeister et al., 2007; Bauer and Baumeister,
2011). To date, more than 200 experimental evaluations of the
ego depletion hypothesis have been published.
The first empirical support for ego depletion was published
in 1998 in two multi-experiment papers (Baumeister et al., 1998;
Muraven et al., 1998), both of which have since become cita-
tion classics: a Google Scholar search conducted July 1st, 2014
returned 1172 citations for Muraven et al. (1998) and 2172 for
Baumeister et al. (1998). The methods Muraven et al. (1998) and
Baumeister et al. (1998) developed to test the limited strength
model are straightforward: first, participants complete either a
version of a task that is designed to be self-control-intensive
(the “depletion” condition) or a version designed to require rela-
tively little self-control (the control condition). Next, participants
complete a different task—also designed to require self-control.
We refer to this experimental method as the sequential task
paradigm. If self-control relies on a limited resource, then par-
ticipants in the depletion condition should perform worse on the
second task than do those in the control condition. We refer to
this pattern of results as the depletion effect.
Hagger et al. (2010) reported a meta-analysis of the 198 pub-
lished tests of the depletion effect, concluding that the evidence
was robust and replicable with an overall effect size of d = 0.62
[95% CI: (0.57, 0.67)]. Despite Hagger et al.’s (2010) conclusion,
we show here that the seemingly strong support for the limited
strength model is likely inflated by small-study effects (i.e., the
tendency for studies with smaller samples to produce larger effect
size estimates), perhaps to the extent that the ostensible evidence
for the depletion effect may purely be an artifact of researchers’
and editors’ aversion to publishing null findings (i.e., publication
bias, the most widely discussed small-study effect). We detail a
promising method for detecting and correcting for small-study
effects that is not currently in widespread use in Psychology,
and based on our results, we argue that current efforts to refine
the limited strength model (e.g., Inzlicht and Schmeichel, 2012;
Kurzban et al., 2013) should be considered secondary in impor-
tance to determining whether truly convincing empirical support
for the foundational finding of the model exists.
Although publication bias, as we will show, may be a problem
for the published literature on the limited strength model, this
problem is certainly not unique to the ego depletion literature.
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Indeed, publication bias very likely influences a disturbingly large
proportion of research literatures in psychology (Bakker et al.,
2012; Ferguson and Brannick, 2012). Our focus on the limited
strength model was born out of our own difficulties in produc-
ing the depletion effect, and we believe that a closer look at
Hagger et al.’s (2010) meta-analysis can function as a case study
on the issue of small-study effects that will be of great use to
researchers in psychology who are interested in either the topics
of self-control or meta-analysis.
Like many others, we have found the limited strength model
to be a helpful tool for developing theory (e.g., McCullough
and Willoughby, 2009; McCullough and Carter, 2011). However,
despite our initial confidence in the evidence for the model,
our attempts at using the sequential task paradigm to gener-
ate novel experimental work were met with failure (Carter and
McCullough, 2013a). In response to our inability to produce the
basic depletion effect in our ownwork, we turned toHagger et al.’s
(2010) meta-analysis for guidance on how to design a successive
experiment so as to maximize our likelihood of success in the
future (e.g., by determining which types of self-control tasks tend
to produce the largest depletion effect and the sample sizes needed
to achieve acceptable statistical power). However, upon reading
Hagger et al. (2010), we realized that their efforts to estimate and
account for the possible influence of publication bias and other
small-study effects had been less than ideal, given the methods
available at the time of its publication. In other words, we were
concerned that Hagger et al.’s (2010) estimates of the depletion
effect might have been inflated to a completely unknown degree,
and as a result, represented a less useful synthesis of the literature
on the depletion effect (i.e., one that could be used to guide future
research) than would have otherwise been the case.
Importantly, the possibility that Hagger et al.’s (2010) meth-
ods for estimating and correcting for small-study effects were less
than ideal does not, in and of itself, invalidate their conclusions,
but given the influence and popularity of the limited strength
model, we felt that there was a need for an estimate of the deple-
tion effect that was maximally useful for guiding future research
(i.e., an estimate of the depletion effect that was relatively robust
to small-study effects). Therefore, our first goal here was to more
thoroughly evaluate the evidence for small-study effects (partic-
ularly publication bias) in Hagger et al.’s (2010) dataset using
recently developed methods and to re-estimate the magnitude of
the depletion effect while taking into account any evidence for
small-study effects. To do so, we applied a set of three statisti-
cal techniques to Hagger et al.’s (2010) published dataset: (1) the
binomial test described by Ioannidis and Trikalinos (2007a); (2)
the trim and fill method (Duval and Tweedie, 2000a,b); and (3)
an extension of Egger’s regression test (Egger et al., 1997; Stanley,
2008; Moreno et al., 2009a). The first method identifies signs of
publication bias, whereas the latter two identify and correct for its
influence.
The application of the extension of Egger’s regression test
and the binomial test to Hagger et al.’s full dataset have been
reported previously (Carter and McCullough, 2013b). The cur-
rent paper details our follow-up to that initial statistical inquiry,
which clearly suggested that the Hagger et al.’s (2010) estimate
of the depletion effect was heavily biased. The follow-up analyses
presented here include (1) the application and discussion of the
popular trim and fill method, (2) the construction of contour-
enhanced funnel plots, and (3) a subset analysis designed to
address the possibility of alternative explanations to our results—
namely, that something other than publication bias has caused
the small-study effects we observed. These additions provide a
much fuller picture of the data, as well as support for our ini-
tial conclusion that the evidence for the depletion effect has likely
been severely overestimated due to publication bias. It is worth
noting that Hagger and Chatzisarantis (2014) have commented
on our previous work (Carter and McCullough, 2013b), and have
independently reproduced those results.
A second, concurrent goal of this paper was to highlight the
use of the extension of Egger’s regression test as a means of
obtaining an estimate of the true underlying effect that is cor-
rected for publication bias (Moreno et al., 2009a; Stanley and
Doucouliagos, 2013). This promising approach, and other related
regression-based methods, are currently in use in the fields of
economics (e.g., Stanley, 2005, 2008; Doucouliagos and Stanley,
2009; Havranek, 2010; Costa-Font et al., 2011) andmedicine (e.g.,
Moreno et al., 2009a,b; Hemingway et al., 2010; Nüesch et al.,
2010; Rücker et al., 2011a,b), but (to our knowledge) has seen
only a single use in Psychology (specifically, in the area of judg-
ment and decisionmaking research; Renkewitz et al., 2011). These
regression-based methods for producing a meta-analytic estimate
of the true underlying effect that is robust to publication bias are
intuitive and easy to use, and the current paper provides readers
with the information needed to begin using the regression-based
methods that we discuss (see the Appendix in the Supplementary
Materials). Furthermore, we also provide the necessary discus-
sion of critical issues that should be considered when undertaking
this type of analysis—that is, statistical heterogeneity and the
difference between small-study effects and publication bias.
It is well known that the accuracy of meta-analysis depends
utterly on the representativeness of the sample of studies that are
analyzed. One way in which a sample can become unrepresenta-
tive is through publication bias (Begg and Berlin, 1988; Rothstein
et al., 2005; Sutton, 2009; Bakker et al., 2012; Ferguson andHeene,
2012; Francis, 2012a), that is, when the likelihood of a study
appearing in that sample is influenced by the study’s results. For
example, publication status is influenced by the presence of sig-
nificant results, and published studies are more visible and acces-
sible to researchers performing meta-analyses (Sutton, 2009).
Therefore, studies with significant, theory-supporting results tend
to bemore likely to end up inmeta-analytic samples. The problem
is that if a sample of studies is biased, in that findings that sup-
port the existence of a particular effect are over-represented, the
magnitude of the meta-analytic estimate of the effect will be over-
estimated (e.g., Stanley, 2008; Sutton, 2009; Bakker et al., 2012;
Francis, 2012a).
Encouragingly, psychological researchers seem to be becoming
increasingly aware of the danger of publication bias (e.g., LeBel
and Peters, 2011; Bakker et al., 2012; Ferguson and Heene, 2012;
Francis, 2012a,b; Schimmack, 2012). In particular, one method
for detecting signs of publication bias by examining the statistical
power of a set of studies (proposed by Ioannidis and Trikalinos,
2007a) has recently gained popularity in psychology (Francis,
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2012a,b; Schimmack, 2012; cf. Simonsohn, 2012). This power-
based method is founded on the idea that one can use the average
statistical power of a set of studies as the likelihood that any sin-
gle study in the set would reach statistical significance. Under
that assumption, a binomial test can be used to examine whether
the observed number of significant findings exceeds the num-
ber that would be expected given the average power of the entire
set. Smaller p-values for this test indicate an excess of significant
results, which suggests that null findings are underrepresented in
the set, possibly due to publication bias. The average power for
a set of studies can be calculated based on a meta-analytic esti-
mate of the effect size, but it can also be calculated based on
the effect size estimate given in each study (Schimmack, 2012). A
recent application of this method to 44 eligible papers published
in one of the most prestigious journals (at least for psychologists
who run experiments) between 2009 and 2012 revealed that 82%
of those papers evinced fewer statistically non-significant results
than would have been expected by chance, implying that publica-
tion bias might be extraordinarily common among the papers in
this particular journal (Francis, 2014).
In their review of meta-analyses published in top psycholog-
ical journals between 2004 and 2009, Ferguson and Brannick
(2012) reported that researchers in psychology have historically
favored two other methods for approaching the problem of pub-
lication bias. The two most commonly used statistical methods
designed specifically to deal with publication bias were the fail-
safe N (used in 22% of meta-analyses in Ferguson and Brannick’s,
2012 sample) and the trim and fill (used in 24% of Ferguson
and Brannick’s, 2012 sample). Importantly, the failsafe N, of
which there are several variations, is based on unrealistic assump-
tions, and has been widely criticized (e.g., Becker, 2005; Ioannidis,
2008; Sutton, 2009; Ferguson and Heene, 2012). Essentially, this
method is designed to provide meta-analysts with license to
ignore the issue of publication bias by estimating the number of
studies with an average effect size of zero that would have to exist
outside of the meta-analytic sample to bring the meta-analytic
estimate to zero if they were included. If this number is suffi-
ciently large, then the effect in question is considered to likely not
be due entirely to publication bias. Though conceptually attrac-
tive, the failsafe N has been referred to as “nothing more than
a crude guide” (Sutton, 2009, p. 442), and its use is thought to
have possibly led to complacency about publication bias (Sutton,
2009). It is fair to say that its use is generally not recommended
(e.g., Becker, 2005; Ioannidis, 2008). For our current purposes, it
is important to note that Hagger et al.’s (2010) use of a version of
the failsafe N (Rosenberg, 2005) revealed that 50,445 unpublished
experiments on the depletion effect with an average effect of zero
would have to exist outside of their dataset to bring their estimate
of d = 0.62 down to zero. Based on this number, they concluded
that “it was highly unlikely that sufficient studies with null effects
would exist to reduce the ego-depletion effect to a trivial value”
(Hagger et al., 2010, p. 508).
The trim and fill (Duval and Tweedie, 2000a,b), the other
method commonly used in psychological research (Ferguson and
Brannick, 2012), represents a considerable improvement over the
failsafe N. This method is based on how the relationship between
effect size estimates and their standard errors in a set of studies
changes in the presence of publication bias (see Bakker et al., 2012
for a review of this topic). To understand this process, imagine a
situation in which the effect in question is truly zero. Estimates
of this effect from individual studies will vary around zero due
to sampling error, providing both under- and overestimates of
the true effect. Therefore, when a set of studies measuring this
effect are plotted with the standard errors of effect size estimates
on the vertical axis and the magnitude of those effect sizes on
the horizontal axis (a so-called funnel plot; Light and Pillemer,
1984), individual studies should scatter into a symmetrical funnel
shape. The funnel shape results from the fact that the estimates
with the highest precision (i.e., those with the smallest standard
errors, and thus, the smallest confidence intervals) will cluster
tightly around zero (the true effect), and less precise estimates
will spread evenly and randomly to the right and left of zero as
standard errors increase. Imagine further that, for this hypothet-
ical null effect, there is a strong belief among researchers that the
effect is positive and non-zero, so that both significant underes-
timates of the effect (i.e., the left side of the funnel) and accurate
non-significant estimates of the effect (i.e., the center of the fun-
nel around zero) are less likely to get published due to publication
bias. If publication status influenced the likelihood of individual
studies being included in the funnel plot in this manner, then
the result would be a distortion of the funnel plot’s symmetry
because of the paucity of unpublished studies (which would tend
to disproportionately make up the points around and to the left of
zero). Due to the asymmetry in the funnel plot, a positive correla-
tion between the magnitude of the effect sizes and their standard
errors would emerge because more precise studies (i.e., those with
smaller standard errors) will have estimates that are closer to zero
(i.e., the true effect size).
The trim and fill estimates the number of missing studies in a
dataset by “trimming” the funnel plot until it is symmetrical and
then “filling” in both sides of the funnel in a way that maintains
symmetry. Following the imputation (“filling in”) of the miss-
ing effect sizes, the underlying effect size is re-estimated using
standard meta-analytic methods. In simulation studies, the trim
and fill has been shown to reduce the bias introduced into meta-
analysis via publication bias; however, it apparently also tends
to under-correct for publication bias, produce incorrect confi-
dence intervals, and occasionally generate false positives (Terrin
et al., 2003; Peters et al., 2007; Moreno et al., 2009a). Based on
these findings, some methodologists do not recommend its use
(Moreno et al., 2009a).
Like the trim and fill, Egger’s regression test is based on the
funnel plot (Egger et al., 1997; Egger and Sterne, 2005); however,
unlike the trim and fill, this test does not assume that publica-
tion bias has led to funnel plot asymmetry. Instead, this method
quantifies the relationship between effect size estimates and their
standard errors, regardless of whether that relationship was pro-
duced by publication bias or some other small-study effect. One
way that Egger’s regression can be described is as a weighted least
squares (WLS) regression model in which effect size is predicted
by standard error (weighted by the inverse of standard error
squared; see the Appendix in the Supplementary Materials). The
significance of the coefficient associated with standard error (i.e.,
the slope coefficient, b1) in the regression model is interpreted as
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a test of funnel plot asymmetry. Historically, only the slope coeffi-
cient of Egger’s regression was interpreted; however, the use of this
model has been expanded, apparently first by Stanley (2005), who
interpreted the model’s intercept (b0) as an estimate of the under-
lying effect size when standard error= 0. In other words, one can
extrapolate from the regression line to an estimate of the effect
size for a hypothetical, perfectly precise study (Stanley, 2005).
Therefore, via a weighted least squares (WLS) regression model,
one can both assess funnel plot asymmetry (the original Egger’s
regression test) and estimate an overall effect that is theoreti-
cally uninfluenced by publication bias. This model is sometimes
referred to as a “precision-effect test” (PET; Stanley, 2005).
Other regression-based methods have also been proposed (for
a review, see Moreno et al., 2009a). For example, simulation
studies revealed that, although highly accurate when the true
underlying effect was zero, PET tended to over-correct for publi-
cation bias, underestimating the true effect when it was non-zero
(Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2007). In response to this result,
Stanley and Doucouliagos (2007) proposed that the variance (i.e.,
standard error squared) be used as a predictor instead of standard
error (a method that is sometimes referred to as a “precision-
effect estimate with standard error,” or PEESE). Because PET is
more accurate when the true underlying effect is zero, and PEESE
is more accurate when the true effect is non-zero, Stanley and
Doucouliagos (2013) further proposed the use of a conditional
estimator (referred to as PET-PEESE): if one can reject the null
hypothesis that b0 = 0 using PET, then b0 from PEESE should be
used as the best estimate of the true effect. However, if one cannot
reject the null hypothesis that b0 = 0 using PET, then b0 fromPET
should be used as the best estimate [see Stanley and Doucouliagos
(2013) for a full treatment of the logic behind the conditional
nature of PET-PEESE]. Simulation studies show that regression-
based methods provide highly accurate estimates of underlying
effects (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2007, 2013; Stanley, 2008;
Moreno et al., 2009a; Stanley et al., 2010; Rücker et al., 2011a,b).
Furthermore, these approaches outperform other methods, par-
ticularly the trim and fill, which, as mentioned above, tends to
under-correct for publication bias (Moreno et al., 2009a; Rücker
et al., 2011a).
In addition to the numerous favorable simulation studies,
there exists one particularly impressive application of regression-
based methods to correct for the influence of publication bias
on a meta-analytic estimate. Turner et al. (2008) published a
report in which they compared the results from the 74 phase
II and phase III trials of antidepressants registered with the US
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to the results of the set
of 50 of those same studies that were eventually published in
peer-reviewed journals. Whether a given study was eventually
published was related to the outcome of the study (i.e., publica-
tion bias): of those trials whose results were eventually published,
94% yielded positive results, whereas only 51% of the full set of
FDA-registered trials yielded positive results. Turner et al. (2008)
reported that the meta-analytic estimate of the underlying effect
(given as Hedges’s g, an unbiased form of Cohen’s d) derived from
the set of FDA-registered trials was g = 0.31. Turner et al. (2008)
also meta-analyzed only the set of those studies that had been
published and found that the estimate of the underlying effect was
larger, g = 0.41. When PET-PEESE was applied to the published
dataset, b0 = 0.19 from PET, but the null hypothesis that b0 = 0
was rejected (i.e., there was evidence of a true underlying effect).
Therefore, b0 from PEESE was calculated, as previous simula-
tions had shown that it would provide the most accurate estimate
of the underlying effect (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2007, 2013;
Moreno et al., 2009a). In this case, b0 from PEESE was b0 = 0.29.
Obviously, this latter estimate of the effect size is only trivially dif-
ferent from the estimate of g = 0.31 that resulted from the meta-
analysis of the full, unbiased set of studies (Moreno et al., 2009b;
Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2013). Thus, the use of PET-PEESE
appears to be an excellent option for approximating an unbi-
ased effect in the face of publication bias. Importantly, both PET
and PEESE can be run using any statistical software that supports
regression (see the Appendix in the Supplementary Materials).
Two clarifications regarding the validity of regression-based
methods are necessary. First, as mentioned, regression-based
methods do not specifically assume that publication bias has
caused funnel plot asymmetry, but rather, model “small-study
effects” (Rücker et al., 2011a,b). The term small-study effects
refers to a collection of (usually unknown) influences that cause
smaller studies to provide systematically different effect size esti-
mates than those provided by larger studies. For example, if
some dependent measures require more resources to collect and
yield larger effect size estimates, then funnel plot asymmetry will
result because studies using these measures will have both smaller
sample sizes and larger effect size estimates than studies that
do not use these measures. Publication bias is another exam-
ple of a small-study effect, since, as described above, it results
in smaller studies providing larger estimates of the underlying
effect than larger studies. It is critical to keep this point in mind
when interpreting the results of methods based on funnel plot
asymmetry: a correlation between effect size and sample size (or
standard error) is not necessarily due to publication bias, and
it is the meta-analyst’s responsibility to explore other possible
explanations (Moreno et al., 2009a; Rücker et al., 2011a).
Although caution is clearly necessary when interpreting coef-
ficients from regression-based methods, one should not make the
mistake of thinking that the coefficients provided by these mod-
els are meaningless outside of clear-cut cases of publication bias.
Depending on the type of small-study effects, the most useful
information provided by a meta-analysis might be an estimate of
the true underlying effect that statistically controls for the influ-
ence of small-study effects (publication bias or otherwise), and
this is exactly what regression-based methods provide. Note that
the same cannot be said for the trim and fill, since the trim and fill
corrects the estimate of the underlying effect by imputing studies
that would be missing in the presence of publication bias, and
then adding them to the existing meta-analytic sample—that is,
the logic underlying the trim and fill is specific to publication
bias, whereas the logic underlying regression-based methods is
more general. Thus, at least in principle, the corrected estimate
provided by the trim and fill is less useful than that provided by
regression-based methods.
The second important clarification about the validity of
regression-based methods regards their performance in the pres-
ence of between-study heterogeneity (i.e., variation in the effect
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size estimates provided by the individual studies). There are
multiple forms of between-study heterogeneity, but the most
important one for the present discussion is statistical heterogene-
ity (Higgins and Thompson, 2002). Statistical heterogeneity is
defined as variation between effect size estimates from individual
studies in a meta-analytic sample that is due to some source other
than random sampling variance—that is, statistical heterogeneity
implies systematic, meaningful differences in individual estimates
of underlying effects. Estimates of statistical heterogeneity in a
meta-analytic sample may indicate that the studies in the sample
are not measuring the same underlying effect in the population,
and use of the methods described above in the presence of statis-
tical heterogeneity is controversial (e.g., Ioannidis and Trikalinos,
2007b; Ioannidis, 2008; Sterne et al., 2011). However, it is impor-
tant to realize that small-study effects, including publication bias,
may be the cause of statistical heterogeneity in some samples
(Rücker et al., 2011a), so it is not appropriate to recommend
that these methods never be applied to meta-analytic samples
that show signs of statistical heterogeneity. Nonetheless, simu-
lation studies have routinely shown that the performance of the
trim and fill suffers in the presence of moderate to large amounts
of statistical heterogeneity (Terrin et al., 2003; Peters et al., 2007;
Moreno et al., 2009a), and that performance of regression-based
methods suffers as well, albeit less so (e.g., Moreno et al., 2009a;
Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2013). In the face of large amounts
of statistical heterogeneity [e.g., an I2 statistic of 50% or more,
which indicates that half or more of the observed between-study
variability is due to sources other than sampling error (Higgins
and Thompson, 2002)], it has been recommended that inference
from methods based on funnel plot asymmetry be undertaken
with caution (Sterne et al., 2011). Additionally, it has also been
recommended that these methods not be applied tometa-analytic
samples that include fewer than 10 studies (Sterne et al., 2011).
The regression-based methods discussed above, although
promising, have not yet gained popularity in psychological sci-
ence. As mentioned above, one of our goals here was to highlight
the advantages of regression-based methods for assessing and
correcting for small-study effects, in the hopes of encouraging
researchers in psychology to begin applying and studying these
techniques. A simultaneous goal was to provide a case study of
the application of this technique, as well as other popular meth-
ods, that would be of interest to large number of researchers.
We believe that Hagger et al.’s (2010) work on the depletion
effect is a good candidate for such a case study for two rea-
sons. First, Hagger et al.’s (2010) meta-analysis seems to exemplify
the types of meta-analyses that are currently conducted in the
psychological literature (Ferguson and Brannick, 2012). Second,
the undeniable popularity of the limited strength model marks
Hagger et al.’s (2010) dataset as particularly useful to a large num-
ber of researchers, and an accurate estimate of the depletion effect
that is robust to small-study effects would likely be of great inter-
est to researchers attempting to design future experiments (e.g.,
enabling them to estimate the effect size they should assume when
calculating target sample sizes so that adequate statistical power is
realized). To this end, we have applied PET-PEESE, along with the
trim and fill and the binomial test, to Hagger et al.’s (2010) pre-
viously published meta-analysis on the depletion effect. We also
demonstrate one possible way of handling significant statistical
heterogeneity and the ruling out of possible small-study effects
beyond publication bias.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
All analyses were conducted using R (R Development Core Team,
2011); see the data sheet in the Supplementary Materials for data
and scripts. Data were obtained fromMartin Hagger, and further
uses of these data should be acknowledged as such (Hagger et al.,
2010).
PRIMARY ANALYSES
Martin Hagger kindly provided us with the coded effect sizes1
for each experiment and the ns for the depletion and con-
trol groups. First, we re-estimated the standard fixed-effect and
random-effects meta-analysis models. Second, the meta-analytic
sample was evaluated for an excess of statistically significant
findings (Ioannidis and Trikalinos, 2007a): we conducted the
binomial test with power calculations based on both the fixed-
effect and random-effects estimates of the underlying effect,
as well as the estimates of the depletion effect provided by
the individual experiments. Third, we applied the trim and fill
method (to both the fixed-effect and random-effects models)
and PET-PEESE.
Secondary analyses: addressing heterogeneity and alternative
explanations
Hagger et al. (2010) explored significant statistical heterogene-
ity in their dataset by investigating whether the overall depletion
effect varied by several experiment characteristics (e.g., the types
of tasks used to induce or measure the depletion effect). To do
so, Hagger et al. (2010) divided their dataset into subsamples of
experiments that shared these characteristics and meta-analyzed
the resulting subsamples separately. The results from this analysis
suggested that few experiment characteristics moderated Hagger
et al.’s (2010) estimate of the depletion effect (i.e., the magni-
tude of the effect changed little across subsamples). We used
the subsamples created by Hagger et al.’s (2010) examination of
moderating influences as a means of addressing the issues of
statistical heterogeneity and small-study effects: first, because sig-
nificant statistical heterogeneity in a meta-analytic sample can
hamper the methods we used, as discussed above, it was prudent
to apply them to more homogeneous subsamples. Second, funnel
plot asymmetry can result from publication bias, but also from
other small-study effects, so applying our methods to subsets of
Hagger et al.’s (2010) dataset that possibly account for any posi-
tive correlation between standard error and effect size would help
us to rule out possible alternative explanations. In other words,
if small-study effects were the result of a particular experiment
characteristic, rather than publication bias, analyzing the subsam-
ples associated with that characteristic should reveal the source
of funnel plot asymmetry. Therefore, we examined the sets of
1Hagger et al. (2010) modified three “outlier” effect sizes, which potentially
obscured funnel plot asymmetry. Therefore, we used the original effect sizes.
Using Hagger et al.’s (2010) transformed values leaves the results we report
here essentially unchanged.
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subsamples created by Hagger et al.’s (2010) moderator analyses
for experiment characteristics that appeared to both (1) account
for statistical heterogeneity and (2) create correlations between
sample size and effect size (i.e., represent potential small-study
effects) across experiments.
For two reasons, the best candidate moderator variable seemed
to be Hagger et al.’s (2010) categorization of experiments by
the “sphere of self-control” tapped by the second task. First,
three of the four subsamples created by dividing up the total
sample on the basis of this categorization scheme showed non-
significant statistical heterogeneity. Second, one subsample, the
“choice and volition” subsample, had the highest average sam-
ple size (n = 162.5 per experiment) and the lowest meta-analytic
effect size estimate (d = 0.22) of all subsamples created in the
moderator analysis—that is, the sphere of self-control tapped by
methods used in individual experiments may have represented a
study-specific characteristic that systematically created a positive
correlation between standard error and effect size that could be
mistaken as evidence for publication bias. Thus, we anticipated
that applying our analyses to these subsamples would allow us to
derive estimates from samples devoid of statistical heterogeneity,
as well as to examine a possible alternative explanation to publi-
cation bias—specifically, that funnel plot asymmetry was caused
by the fact that the choice and volition subsample produced both
larger samples and smaller effect size estimates. Spheres were
defined by Hagger et al. (2010) as “Controlling impulses” (e.g.,
tasks that required participants to resist temptation or override
habits; k = 104), “Cognitive processing” (e.g., tasks that required
the maintenance of a high level of cognitive effort; k = 47),
“Choice and volition” (tasks that required participants to actively
make choices; k = 8), and “Social processing” (tasks that required
participants to respond appropriately in social contexts; k = 33).
We applied the methods described above to each of these four
subsamples2.
2Six of the 198 experiments could not be assigned to any of the four “sphere of
self-control” categories. Therefore, following Hagger et al. (2010), we omitted
these experiments from any subsample analyses (i.e., the subsample analyses
are conducted on only 192 of the 198 experiments).
Finally, we created contour-enhanced funnel plots (Peters
et al., 2008) for the total sample and the four subsamples.
Contour-enhanced funnel plots are funnel plots in which the
area of statistical non-significance is highlighted. When funnel
plot asymmetry is due to studies missing primarily from the area
of non-significance, one’s confidence that asymmetry is due to
publication bias, rather than other small-study effects, should
increase (Peters et al., 2008).
RESULTS
The fixed-effect and random-effects meta-analysis models
(Table 1), the two versions of the binomial test (Table 1), the trim
and fill (Table 2), and PET-PEESE (Table 3) were applied to the
overall sample and to each subsample of effect sizes. (Note that
the results for the binomial test and PET-PEESE applied to the
full sample—in which outliers were modified, per Hagger et al.
(2010)—appear in Carter and McCullough (2013b). All other
analyses reported here, including all analyses involving the four
“spheres of self-control” subsamples, are unique to this article).
Contour-enhanced funnel plots (also unique to this article) are
displayed in Figure 1. As recommended, the binomial test was
conducted as a one-tailed test (Ioannidis and Trikalinos, 2007a),
and p < 0.10 was used as the cutoff for tests of funnel plot
asymmetry (Egger et al., 1997).
First, in all but the choice and volition subsample, binomial
tests indicated that the observed number of significant findings
exceeded the expected number (Table 1). Moreover, it is clear that
average power is lower than the recommended 0.80 in all cases,
ranging from 0.31 to 0.69.
Second, the trim and fill method required that each sample be
increased by 25–39% to achieve funnel plot symmetry (Table 2),
and in all but the choice and volition subsample, the estimate of
the overall effect was reduced by 15–26% as a result of the trim
and fill procedure. Examination of the contour-enhanced funnel
plots (Figure 1) suggests that asymmetry is mainly due to a lack
of data points in the area of statistical non-significance (except for
the choice and volition subsample).
Third, according to the coefficients in the regression models,
all samples showed clear evidence for funnel plot asymmetry.
Table 1 | Standard meta-analysis models and p-values for the binomial tests.
Sample Standard meta-analysis models Statistical power and p-values for the binomial tests
FE: Overall effect RE: Overall effect Heterogeneity: k with Powind(p) PowFE(p) PowRE(p)
Q and I2 p < 0.05
Full 0.62 (0.58, 0.66) 0.68 (0.63, 0.74) 320.68; 38.6% 151 0.63 (5.63e-05) 0.55 (3.72e-10) 0.62 (8.32e-06)
CI 0.71 (0.65, 0.77) 0.75 (0.67, 0.83) 167.83; 38.6% 79 0.65 (0.012) 0.62 (0.001) 0.66 (0.015)
CP 0.60 (0.52, 0.68) NA 43.03; 0% 34 0.58 (0.032) 0.54 (0.009) NA
CV 0.24 (0.13, 0.35) NA 4.52; 0% 3 0.38 (0.65) 0.31 (0.47) NA
SP 0.69 (0.60, 0.78) NA 29.11; 0% 32 0.69 (8.19e-05) 0.67 (2.53e-05) NA
Full = the full sample; CI = controlling impulses subsample; CP = cognitive processing subsample; CV = choice and volition subsample; SP = social processing
subsample; FE = fixed-effect; RE = Random-effects. All p-values for overall effects and for the Q statistics, with the exception of for the CP, CV, and SP subsamples,
were less than 0.001. Numbers given in parentheses are the lower and upper limits of the 95% confidence intervals. For each binomial test, average power was
calculated from three possible sources: Powind = power based on the effect sizes reported within individual experiments; PowFE = power based on the fixed-effect
meta-analysis estimate of the overall effect size; PowRE = power based on the random-effects meta-analysis estimate of the overall effect size.
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Table 2 | Results from the trim and fill.
Sample Trim and fill
“Filled” studies FE: Overall effect RE: Overall effect
Full 73 0.48 (0.44, 0.51) 0.50 (0.44, 0.56)
CI 36 0.55 (0.50, 0.60) 0.56 (0.48, 0.65)
CP 12 0.51 (0.44, 0.56) 0.51 (0.43, 0.60)
CV 2 0.22 (0.11, 0.33) 0.22 (0.11, 0.33)
SP 13 0.56 (0.48, 0.64) 0.57 (0.46, 0.67)
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; †p < 0.10. Full = the full sample; CI = con-
trolling impulses subsample; CP= cognitive processing subsample; CV= choice
and volition subsample; SP = social processing subsample; FE = fixed-effect;
RE = Random-effects. All overall effects are significant, p < 0.001. Numbers
given in parentheses are the lower and upper limits of the 95% confidence
intervals.
Table 3 | Results from PET-PEESE.
Sample PET PEESE
b0 b1 b0 b1
Full −0.10 (−0.23, 0.02) 2.72*** 0.25 (0.18, 0.32) 4.74***
CI −0.24 (−0.50, 0.02) 3.19*** 0.26 (0.13, 0.40) 4.76***
CP 0.02 (−0.35, 0.39) 2.08† 0.33 (0.14, 0.51) 3.37**
CV 0.06 (−0.14, 0.27) 1.25** 0.16 (0.06, 0.26) 3.48*
SP 0.18 (−0.10, 0.47) 1.94*** 0.45 (0.30, 0.60) 3.32***
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; †p < 0.10. Full = the full sample; CI =
controlling impulses subsample; CP = cognitive processing subsample; CV =
choice and volition subsample; SP = social processing subsample. For PET and
PEESE, b0 = the intercept (i.e., the corrected estimate of the overall effect),
b1 = the coefficient for standard error or variance (i.e., the test for funnel plot
asymmetry). Numbers given in parentheses are the lower and upper limits of
the 95% confidence intervals.
Most notably, results from applying PET-PEESE clearly suggest
that the true underlying effect for the overall sample and each
of the subsamples is not distinguishable from zero (Table 3): in
each case, b0 was not statistically significant for PET, suggesting
that b0 from PEESE will be an overestimate of the true effect and
that the least biased estimate is given by b0 from the PET models
[the mathematical explanation for this conditional approach is
described by Stanley and Doucouliagos (2013), and their accom-
panying simulation experiments further support its use]. Note
that results from PET-PEESE for the choice and volition subsam-
ple should be treated with caution, however, since it is made up
of fewer than 10 experiments (Sterne et al., 2011).
DISCUSSION
Our findings suggest that the published literature on the depletion
effect is clearly influenced by small-study effects, and as a result,
overestimates the strength of the phenomenon. Furthermore, it
would appear that this overestimation is likely due to publication
bias, rather than some other small-study effect: the results from
the binomial tests and visual inspection of the contour-enhanced
funnel plots suggests that asymmetry is due to a conspicuous
lack of statistically non-significant findings, and our subsample
FIGURE 1 | Contour-enhanced funnel plots. Effect sizes in the gray area
are statistically non-significant. The solid angled lines represent the bounds
within which 95% of studies should fall if there is no statistical
heterogeneity. The solid vertical line represents the estimate for the overall
effect from the fixed-effect model. The dashed vertical line represents the
estimate of the overall effect from the random-effects model.
analysis suggests that controlling for the most likely source of
small-study effects (i.e., between-study differences in themethods
used to measure dependent variables) does not eliminate funnel
plot asymmetry. The application of a regression-based method
(i.e., PET-PEESE), which was designed to correct for small-study
effects, including publication bias, and which current evidence
suggests provides the most unbiased estimate of the true underly-
ing effect (e.g., Stanley, 2008; Moreno et al., 2009a; Rücker et al.,
2011a; Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2013), indicates that the deple-
tion effect is not distinguishable from zero. Put succinctly—and
counter to our own personal intuitions about how human psy-
chology works—after controlling for the influence of small-study
effects, our results do not support the claim that the depletion
effect is meaningfully different from zero.
One limitation to our analysis is that we addressed the poten-
tial overestimation of the depletion effect purely via statisti-
cal techniques rather than by trying to incorporate relevant
unpublished results. Although important, this limitation must be
qualified by two points. First, although conscientious efforts at
retrieval of unpublished work are worthwhile, such efforts alone
do not obviate concern about overestimation due to publication
bias because there are serious barriers to collecting the results
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of unpublished studies. For example, many null findings are not
only unpublished, but also lack any form of written documen-
tation, and thus, are very difficult to track down. One apparent
consequence of these barriers is that the successful collection of
a sample of unpublished studies that is unbiased (i.e., a sample
that is representative of all unpublished studies) is quite rare, so
the inclusion of unpublished studies may introduce additional
unknown forms of bias (Ferguson and Brannick, 2012).
Second, it may actually be impossible to collect certain null
findings because these findings have been transformed into pos-
itive findings through statistical adjustments or the exercise of
undisclosed “researcher degrees of freedom” (Simmons et al.,
2011) that inflate the chances that results will reach statistical sig-
nificance. Examples of such practices include excluding outliers
post-hoc, using multiple outcome measures and only reporting
results for ones that reached statistical significance, and optional
stopping—that is, halting data collection to test for significance
and resuming data collection if significance is not found. A recent
survey of researchers in psychology suggests that these practices
are frequent—for excluding data post-hoc, failing to report all
dependent measures, and optional stopping, the estimated preva-
lence was 62%, 78%, and 72%, respectively—so the bias they
introduce is a concern for all literatures in psychology (John et al.,
2012). If the exaggeration of evidence for an effect is due to the
use of undisclosed researcher degrees of freedom, even a complete
collection of unpublished results cannot obviate this influence
because null results will have been turned into statistically signifi-
cant results (Ferguson and Heene, 2012). To be clear, we have no
reason to believe—and in fact, we do not believe—that this prob-
lem is more characteristic of the literature on the limited strength
model than it might be of other literatures in psychology.
Importantly, taking advantage of researcher degrees of free-
dom seems to inflate funnel plot asymmetry: Bakker et al. (2012)
simulated a literature in which the true effect was d = 0, and
the production of “observed” experiments—that is, those that
made it into the simulated meta-analyses—was influenced by
publication bias. For these simulated data, the meta-analytic
estimate of the true effect was d = 0.35, and the funnel plot
was significantly asymmetric (the standardized asymmetry coef-
ficient for Egger’s regression test, which is analogous to b1 in
PET, was 3.96, p < 0.001). When the use of researcher degrees
of freedom was added to the simulation, the meta-analytic esti-
mate was further inflated to d = 0.48, and the coefficient for
Egger’s regression increased to 6.07, p < 0.001. These results
demonstrate that use of researcher degrees of freedom is, like
publication bias, an example of a small-study effect (i.e., one
way in which a correlation between effect sizes and standard
errors might arise in a meta-analytic sample). Since the inter-
action of researcher degrees of freedom and publication bias
creates an increase in funnel plot asymmetry, regression-based
methods can be argued to produce an estimate of the under-
lying effect that is robust to both publication bias and the use
of researcher degrees of freedom, whereas attempts at collecting
unpublished data cannot account for the influence of the use
of researcher degrees of freedom. To our knowledge, the use of
regression-based methods to correct for the influence of the use
of researcher degrees of freedom has yet to be formally assessed;
however, it would seem to be a promising avenue for future
work3.
We do not wish to imply that thorough attempts at collecting
unpublished data are worthless (in fact, we are currently engaged
in an effort to collect unpublished tests of the depletion effect in
hopes of updating Hagger et al.’s conclusions in a manner that
takes into account both published and unpublished results), but
the ever-present specter of publication bias, as well as the appar-
ently widespread use of researcher degrees of freedom (John et al.,
2012), therefore means that statistical techniques such as the ones
we employed here will continue to be essential to any endeavor to
meta-analytically evaluate the evidence for any effect.
Based on responses from reviewers of previous drafts of this
paper, as well as a commentary by Hagger and Chatzisarantis
(2014) on our related work (Carter and McCullough, 2013b), we
would like to anticipate and respond to some potential objec-
tions to our analyses and conclusions. First, some might argue
that our claim that Hagger et al. (2010) have likely overestimated
the magnitude of the depletion effect is unimportant because
research in all areas of science is biased. Although we agree that
bias is likely rampant, we hold that if it is worthwhile to conduct
a meta-analysis on a topic, it is worthwhile to provide the most
accurate estimate of the underlying effect as possible. We think
there are good reasons to believe that the estimates we provide
here are more accurate than those initially provided by Hagger
et al. (2010).
Second, our argument that the depletion effect is indistin-
guishable from zero implies that a large number of experiments
that have produced null or negative (i.e., performing self-control
improves subsequent self-control) findings have been conducted
but not reported. As mentioned, it is likely that some (perhaps
many) null or negative results have been converted to positive
findings via the use of researcher degrees of freedom, though
Hagger and Chatzisarantis (2014) are skeptical that publication
bias and the undisclosed exercise of researcher degrees of freedom
could be as widespread in the ego depletion literature as what
3A method based on the p-curve technique (Simonsohn et al., 2014a) is cur-
rently being developed for providing an estimate of the underlying effect that
is robust to publication bias and the undisclosed use of researcher degrees
of freedom. The p-curve method assumes that publication bias and the use
of researcher degrees of freedom (also called “p-hacking”) result in p-values
that are disproportionately close to the p < 0.05 criterion (e.g., more p-values
within the interval of 0.04 < p < 0.05 than other intervals). This method is
thoroughly discussed in a working paper by Simonsohn et al. (2014b). One
point relevant to the depletion effect is that caution is required when using
the p-curve technique on a literature that includes tests of attenuated inter-
action hypotheses (i.e., situations in which the effect of interest is thought
to be reduced or eliminated at one level of a moderator, but not at another
level; Simonsohn et al., 2014b). Many effect sizes in the Hagger et al. (2010)
dataset were taken from the unattenuated simple effects of such interactions,
and are ineligible for use with the p-curve method. These effects violate the
core assumption of the p-curve analysis because publication bias and the use
of researcher degrees of freedom are assumed to focus on making the p-value
for the interaction effect just significant enough, which in turn requires the p-
value for the unattenuated simple effect to be even smaller. Importantly, there
is no explicit reason that these same effects would be inappropriately modeled
by PET-PEESE, although it is not known whether their presence affects the
accuracy of the estimates in any way.
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we are speculating here. However, given the difficulties inherent
in determining the nature and number of unpublished findings
(as discussed above), Hagger and Chatzisarantis’s (2014) belief is
based chiefly on their intuitions about how research in this area
is conducted—specifically, that researchers, reviewers, and edi-
tors handling data or manuscripts on the limited strength model
would view null or negative results as worth pursuing and pub-
lishing as is, rather than consigning such results to their hard
drives or file drawers, or working to transform them into rejec-
tions of the null hypothesis through the exercise of researcher
degrees of freedom. Since there is no empirical basis for Hagger
and Chatzisarantis’s argument [while there is an empirical basis
for our argument that (1) the exercise of researcher degrees of
freedom in psychology in general is widespread (John et al., 2012),
and (2) many more rejections of the null hypothesis are appear-
ing in at least some psychology journals than should be expected
by chance (Francis, 2014)], their objection does not invalidate
our conclusions, although it does highlight the importance of
attempts at documenting the unpublished literature.
We do not wish to imply that we have unquestionably shown
that the depletion effect is not a real phenomenon. The claim that
the depletion effect is indistinguishable from zero is dependent
on the validity of PET-PEESE, which, although promising, is still
a relatively new method. Moreover, we are not suggesting that the
limited strength model should be abandoned. Instead, we believe
our results are best interpreted as demonstrating that the current
evidence for the depletion effect is not convincing, despite the
hundreds of experiments that have examined it.
We hope that the findings we present here will motivate
researchers to re-examine the replicability and the magnitude of
the depletion effect. Because our findings suggest that very large
experiments will produce estimates of the depletion effect that are
approximately zero, a useful next step would be a coordinated
series of large, pre-registered direct replications of the original
experiments (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998). Pre-registering the
methods for replications, as well as committing to making the
data available regardless of their outcomes, would completely
prevent publication bias. Given that our results support the
conclusion that the depletion effect is approximately zero, it is
difficult to know how big of a sample should be collected for
these pre-registered replications or for any future experiments on
the depletion effect. Regardless, researchers should be prepared
to collect far larger samples than have been collected previously
in this literature. For example, if we assume an overall effect of
d = 0.25 (b0 from PEESE for the full sample), 80% power would
be reached with n = 252 per condition. In contrast, the approx-
imate average n per condition in Hagger et al. (2010)’s dataset
was n = 27, with an approximate inter-quartile range spanning
n = 17 to n = 31 per condition. In other words, if b0 from PEESE
happened to be the correct estimate of the underlying effect size
instead of the non-significant b0 from PET, 75% of the experi-
ments in Hagger et al. (2010) would have needed to be at least
700% larger to obtain adequate power.
The broadest conclusion to be drawn from our findings is that
unless methods for controlling publication bias and researcher
degrees of freedom come to be taken more seriously, such as the
development and use of statistical techniques (like PET-PEESE),
some system for the required pre-registration of experiments—or
until researchers, reviewers, and editors manage their aversion to
the null hypothesis (Greenwald, 1975) through other measures—
psychological science will likely falter in its efforts to develop
trustworthy models, not only of self-control, but of every other
psychological phenomenon as well.
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